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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

RUSSELL A: i'ON, AllDRL\I AC:TOiJ
and CAROL E .. AC'i'Otl ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.
J. B. DELIRAN, a Utah
corporation; GERALD
HOUSE; ERA REALTY CENTER;
DARYL YATES and MARYDOtl YATES,
husband and wife,

Case No. 19300

Defendants-Respondents,
and Cross-Appellants.

RESPONDING BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellants and Cross-Respondents, Russell
Acton, Andrew Acton and Carol E. Acton,
as the "Actons")

(hereafter referred to

justifiably relied upon misrepresentations,

made either mistakenly or recklessly, by defendant-respondent
ERA prior to the Actons' purchase of a small building and
surrounding property in Cedar City, Utah.

The misrepresenta-

tions concerned the legality of a water hookup on the
property.
purchased

As a result of ERA's misrepresentations, the Actons
d

building ana property with no legal water hookup on

it, and suosegucntly le3rned that it would cost the Actons

almost as much as the purchase price to acquire a le0al water
hooKup.

The Actons sought to have the real estate contract

with defendants-respondents and cross-appellants J. B. Deliran
and Gerald House rescinded and recover from them all payments
the Actons have made on the property since they purchased it.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

Following a jury trial on the Actons' claims for
rescission based upon fraudulent misrepresentations and mutual
mistake, the jury found that the real estate contract between
the Actons and J. B. Deliran and Gerald House should be upheld,
and dismissed the Actons' claims against J. B. Deliran, House
and ERA.

The trial court denied the Actons' motions for a

directed verdict anc judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
entered a judgment in accordance with the jury verdict.
Subsequently, the trial court awarded the Actons $16,450 in
damages as a result of J.B. Deliran and House's failure to
provide the Actons with access to the property at issue.

The

trial court had determined, as a matter of law, that access was
part and parcel of the land sale contract between the Actons
and J. B. Deliran and House.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Actons assert that tho "Statement of Facts" set
forth in their original brief filed in this appeal is a
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succinct ano obJective recapitulation of the factual record in
this case.

However, pursuant to Rule 75 (b) (2) of the Utah

Rules of :::ivil Proceoure, the Actons will respond to ERA's
"Statement of Facts."
On pp. 3-4 of ERA's brief, ERA discusses the purchase
of the Yates property by J. B. Deliran, and then states that
while the Yates listing indicated that water was in the
building on the property, the Deliran listing

(which the Actons

claimed at trial was never shown to them until after the
closing on the property -- Trial Transcript ("Tr.") at 203-204,
237-2d3,

291-292)

indicated that city water was not available.

Then ERA states that Deliran and the Actons entered into an
Earnest 11one1 Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement.

It is

important for the Court to note that the Earnest lloney Receipt
a11. Ofter to Purchase Agreement did not indicate if city water
was or was not provided on the property (Tr. at 358-359).
In their next paragraph, on p. 4, ERA states that
Andrew Acton saw the Yates listing the first time he saw the
property,

then visited the property again in June of 1981,

after the property had been purchased by J.B. Deliran.

ERA

neglects to mention that, at that second visit, even though the
property had been purchased by J. B. Deliran and relisted by
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J.B. Deliran with ERA, the ERA sales agent showed Mr. Acton
the same Yates listing he had seen on his first visit to the
property (Tr.

at 184-185, 313, 344).

On p. 5 of their brief, ERA states that "[P]laintiffs
claim there is some dispute as to what Behunin told Plaintiffs
concerning the availability of water

.

The Actons have

never claimed that there was any dispute as to what Behunin
said.

His deposition testimony, and his trial testimony, are

very clear.

ERA has pulled out selected portions of his trial

testimony to give the impression that Behunin,

the

City

building inspector, put the Actons on notice that there was
some problem with the legality of the water flowing from the
frost-free spigot on the property.

In fact, Behunin's

testimony clearly shows that Behunin and the Actons were merely
talking about a water meter hookup, a device which measures
water usage, and which would cost around $1,000

(Tr. at 240)

They were not discussing the legality of a water pipeline that
would bring water to the property (Tr. at 407-409).

In

particular, Behunin states that he doesn't recall saying
anything to the Actons at the time of their meeting "other than
they would have to get a meter"

(Tr. at 409).

ERA then quotes

Behunin's testimony under cross-examination by

all

Behunin says is that he told the Actons that they needed to get
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a water meter, and to do that they would have to see Bud Bauer,
the superintendent of the Cedar City Municipal Water System
(Tr. at 420).

It is important to note that Behunin reiterated

that he did not tell the Actons that the water connection was
i 11ega1 (Tr . at 4 2 2) .
On p. 6 of their brief, ERA states that the survey
prepared by David Grimshaw makes reference to a sewer
connection location but "fails to indicate that a water meter
was discovered during the course of the survey."

Once again,

even though this is a "Statement of Facts," ERA is arguing, by
implication, that the Actons should have realized that there
was a problem with the water because a water meter was not
discovered during the course of the survey work.

As Grimshaw

clearly testifiec at trial, he was not being paid to look for a
water meter, and therefore his survey failed to mention that a
water meter was or was not discovered during the course of his
survey (Tr. at 488, 492).
ERA then spends almost seven pages quoting or
paraphrasing trial testimony.

In effect, ERA has devoted most

of its "Statement of Facts" to its argument.
With regard to Grimshaw's testimony, quoted on pp. 7-8
of ERA's brief,

argues that the Actons were on notice about

a water problem prior to the closing of the property sale in
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this case because Grimshaw testified that Wayne Smith told
Russell Acton of a problem with the water on the doy of the
survey, mentioned above.

Grimshaw's testimony is specifically

and categorically disputed by Russell Acton's testimony at
trial.

Russell Acton recalls no discussion, at any time when

he was standing with Wayne Smith and Grimshaw, about.any water
problems, or any water rights of Wayne Smith, notwithstanding
the implication ERA tries to draw at pp. 10-11 of their brief.
Russell testified that his discussion with Smith on the day of
the survey solely concerned the boundary lines and the access
problem on the property.

Russell further testified that he

spoke for only ten or fifteen minutes with Mr. Smith, out of
the several hours Russell was involved in the survey.

He also

said that there were times when he was 25-30 feet away from
Smith and Grimshaw when they were talking together, and he was
not involved in, nor could hear, their conversation (Tr. at
496-497).

Russell's testimony also serves to specifically and

cate3orically repudiate the testimony of Smith, quoted by ERA
in their brief at pr. 9-10.

Smith also undercut his own

credibility when he testified, in response to crossexamination, that he couldn't recall the exact times he talked
with the Actons about the water problem, and that those times
could have been after the closing date on
471, 473-474).
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property (Tr. at

At pp. 11-13, ERA paraphrases, and then quotes, the
testimony of llancy Hale, ar1other salesperson for ERA.

They

paraphrase her testimony about what she assumes Behunin told
the Actons at their meeting at the property, discussed above.
Such assumptions were proven false at trial by Behunin's
specific testimony, previously cited herein.

Her testimony

about her "dialogue" with Russell Acton is quoted in order to
imply to the Court that he didn't say anything in response to
her questions about the illegal hookup because he agreed with
her recapitulation of events.

All of Russell's testimony prior

to that in the trial, and subsequently in rebuttal, refute that
implicalion.
All the testimony paraphrased or quoted by ERA in
their "Statement of Facts" is disputed by the Actons.

Not only

does it ditfer from the Actons' "Statement of Facts," which is
supported by references to the record, but the Actons'
refutation of ERA' s "Statement of Facts" is supported by
references to the record.
ARGUMEtJT
I.

7he evidence does not support the jury verdict
in the trial of this case which affirmed the
contract between the Actons and J.B. Deliran
and House, and the trial court should have
grantee the Actons' motion for a directed
or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
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ERA makes the same argument in
in

§

§

1 of Its Argument as

It claims that there was evidence at

2 of its Argument.

trial upon which the jury could base its decision to affirm the
land sale contract between the Actons and J. E. Deliran and
House, and therefore the trial court acted properly in refusing
to grant the Actons' motions for a directed verdict or for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

In response to this

argument, and in the interests of judicial and financial
economy, the Actons reargue and incorporate by reference herein
their argument, supported by extensive references to the
record, in their original brief in this appeal, at pp. 5-20.
The Actons specifically note that, at pp. 18-19 of their
original brief in this appeal, they discussed the case cited by
ERA, Kaer v. Mayfair 11arkets, 19 Ut.2d 339, 431 P.2d 566
(1967).

The Actons reiterate that the Utah Supreme Court

stated that the party against whom a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is made is entitled only to
"reasonable inferences"

(emphasis added).

Kaer v. Mayfair

Markets, 431 P.2d at 570.
As stated in the Actons' original brief in this
appeal, the testimony of Wayne Smith, upon whom all
defendancs-respondents rely,
is incompetent.

is so vague and uncertain that it

No reasonable inferences can be drawn from his
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Also,

the testimony of David Grimshaw, the surveyor

upon whom all defendants-respondents also rely in their briefs,
was not specific with regard to his recollections, and the
Actons submit that reasonable inferences cannot be drawn from
his testimony, either.
II.

ERA was not a party to the Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement
executed by the Actons and J. B. Deliran
and House, and cannot seek attorney's
fees under that Agreement.

ERA attempts to prove, by way of some novel arguments,
tnat they were a party to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase Agreement executed by the Actons and J.B. Deliran
and House,

and because that contract was affirmed by the jury

in the trial of this case, they are entitled to attorney's fees
based upon the language in the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase Agreement, as set forth in their brief at p. 17.
ER,'s first puint is that, in response to the Actons'
Complaint to rescind the contract, and in order to retain the
sales commission paid to them by J.B. Deliran and House, ERA
had to come into Court to enforce the contract.

However, ERA

was not made a party in this lawsuit because they were a party
to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Agreement,
but rather because their salesperson had made
misrepresentations to the Actons concerning water on the
prorerty.

The 'ctons brou3ht ERA into the lawsuit on the
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theories of fraudulent misrepresentation or mutual mistake, not
breach of contract.
March 30, 1982.

See, Actons'

Second Amended Complaint,

Just because, during the course of their

defense of the action, the posture of ERA was to enforce the
contract does not make them privy to the contract.

The hollow

nature of Era's theory is shown by ERA's inability to cite any
case law in support of their contention.

Indeed, agency case

law holds that, even though an agent's actions

(for which he or

she receives a commission) help bring about the execution of a
sales contract, that agent is not a party to a lawsuit in which
the principal seeks to enforce a contract.
434 P.2d 221, 225

Loftis v. LaSalle,

(Okla. 1967); Mitten v. lleston, 615 P.2d

60,61 (Colo. App. 1980).
The next theory offered by ERA in support of their
quest for attorney's fees, and one even more incredible than
the first theory, boils down as follows.

If ERA was an agent

of J.B. Deliran, as the trial court found as a matter of law,
it must have merged with J. B. Deliran, was "one in the same"
(ERA's brief at p. 19) as J.B. Deliran, and therefore could
claim the same legal rights as J. B. Deliran.

Clearly, agents

don't have the same legal rights as their principals.

Yet ERA

is now trying to claim the legal privileges that only accrue to
the principal in an agency-principal relationship, even though
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they argueo throughout the trial that they were the agent of J.
B. Deliran and could not be legally accountable for their
actions undertaken within the scope of their employment by J.B.
Deliran.
ERA then cites Usinger v.
P.2d 1018

280 Or.751, 572

(1977), claiming that it supports ERA's position,

though that position is hardly clear from ERA's brief.
Usinger case,

In the

there was a dispute between the parties about the

of the contract.
specific performance.

The plaintiff brought suit seeking
The defendant claimed that plaintiff

failed to live up to some of the terms of the contract, and
therefore the defendant was released from its duty to perform
under the contract.

The court in Usinger found for the

defendant and granted it attorney's fees.
the instant case,

However, unlike in

the legal theories of both parties in the

Usinger case were grounded upon the validity of the land sale
contract at issue.

Since both parties felt that the contract

was valid, both parties were bound by the attorney's fee clause
in that contract.

Not so in the instant case.

sought rescission of the contract.

The Actons

The Usinger case cannot be

used to support ERA's argument for attorney's fees.
ERA bases its claim for attorney's fees upon the
wording

in tne Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase

Agreement at lines 47-48:
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If either party fails so to do, he agrees to
pay all expenses of enforcing this
Agreement, or of any right arising out of
the breach thereof, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(Brief of

at 17.)

This argument assumes that ERA is a

party to the Agreement, a claim disputed by the Actons and
discussed earlier in this brief.

The meaning of the cited

clause is that if either party fails to carry out their
obligations under the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase Agreement, the other party has a right to collect
attorney's fees for the enforcement of the Agreement.

It is

the position of the Actons, and this position was supported by
the trial court in tne post-trial hearings in this case (Tr. of
March 3, 1983 hearing at 88-89), that none of the
defendants-respondents were entitled to attorney's fees because
their defense of the Actons'

action for rescission of the

contract or damages resulting from tortious misrepresentations
was not an enforcement of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase Agreement required by some breach by the Actons.
All payments were current on the sale of the property and the
Actons had fulfilled all other obligations under the Agreement.
The Actons have been unable to find any cases, state
or federal, with facts similar to the instant one;

that is,

where a party unsuccessfully sought to rescind a real property
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sale (the property being

pursuant to an Earnest Money

Agreement that included an attorney's fees clause) and the
prevailing deiendant claimed attorney's fee:.

The courts

generally do not grant contractually-mandated attorney's fees
in cases where the party seeking rescission, or a disaffirmance
of the entire contract, prevails.
P.2d 450, 458

BLT Investment v. Snow, 586

(Ut. 1978); Bodenhamer v. Patterson, 278 Or. 367,

563 P.2d 1212, 1218 (1977).

Similarly, where a party brings an

action to enforce a contract, e.g. specific performance or
foreclosure, the courts have granted contractually-mandated
attorney's fees.

Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Ut. 1977);

Anaheim Co. v. Elliot, 45 Or. App. 597, 609 P.2d 382 (1930).
In tne instant case, however, the Actons initiated the
litigation 2nd sought rescission of the land sale contract, or
damages for tort1ous misrepresentations.

They did not pursue a

remedy in the nature of enforcing the contract.

They felt they

had been defrauded, or at the very least, led to believe there
was water on their newly-purchased property.
It seems manifestly unfair to allow any of the
defendants-respondents attorney's fees for defending
successfully against a rescission action when the Actons, as a
matter of law, would nol have received attorney's fees had they
preva1led.

Individtials who >1ant to bring rescission suits
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already face the prospect of their own attorney's fees and, of
course, the usual risk of loss of the suit.

The risk of paying

a defendant's attorney's fees as well will have a chilling
eftect on these individuals'

exercise of their rights to seek

redress in the courts.
Other courts have acted to prevent such unilateral
unfairness.

In United States v. Peter Kiewit and Sons' Co.,

235 F. Supp.

500

(D. Alaska 1964), an insurance company sued a

contractor under a federal statute to recover premiums for
worker's compensation insurance.

The statute granted

attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs, but not to defendants
who defended successfully.

The defendants argued that they

should, as a matter of equity and fairness,
attorney's fees.

be granted

The court agreed with tneir argument.

Peter Kiewit and Sons' Co.

While

is the converse of the instant case,

the principles of equity and justice underlying that court's
decision are relevant and applicable.
Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832, 836-837

See also, Devore v.

(Ut. 1981)

(Stewart, J.,

concurring and dissenting).
The Actons pursued a claim of rescission,

knowing that

they would not be granted attorney's fees if they won.

They

probably would not have brought this lawsuit if they knew they
risked losing not only the difference monetarily between the
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property with water on it and without water, and their own
attorney's fees, but also defendants-respondents' attorney's
fees.

The issue of attorney's fees under the instant set of

facts is one of first impression for this Court.

With no

precedent to guide it, the Court must look to a sense of
justice and fairness in making its decision.

The Actons submit

that such a sense requires that ERA's appeal for attorney's
fees be denied.
III. The trial court was correct in denying
attorne/'S tees to ERA pursuant to
§ 73-27-56, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as
amended).
ERA argues at p. 21 of their brief that the trial
court should have awarded them attorney's fees on the basis of
§

78-27-56, Utah Code Ann.

(1953, as amended), the Utah Code

provision providing statutory non-contractual rights to
attorney's fees where a court determines that an action or
defense to a law suit was without merit and was not brought or
asserted in good faith.

The gravamen of ERA's argument is that

nothing in the prayer of the Actons' Second Amended Complaint
could be effectively granted against ERA.

ERA argues that,

even if the jury in the trial of this matter had found for the
Actons, the trial court coulc not have ordered ERA to rescind
the land sale contract at issue, nor could it have assessed
against ERA, because ERA was not a party to the
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contract.

By the way,

it is significant that ERA goes back to

this argument, when earlier in its brief it was claiming it was
in fact party to the contract.
What ERA' s argument misses is that the Ac tons,

in

their Second Amended Complaint, sought rescission or, in the
alternative, damages.

However, the damages sought by the

Actons were not damages for breach of contract, but rather
damages for tortious misrepresentations.

An examination of all

of the pleadings and of all the transcripts of the hearings in
this case clearly shows that, by the time all the parties got
to the trial in this matter, the main issues for the jury to
decide were those of fraudulent misrepresentation or mutual
mistake.

At the pre-trial hearing in this case, held in Cedar

City on August 19, 1982, one of the main discussions before the
court was ERA's motion to dismiss itself from the Complaint.
Throughout the discussion at the pre-trial hearing, ERA
admitted that they had exposure under the Actons'
misrepresentation cause of action.

fraudulent

The jury would have to

decide whether any representations made by ERA's salesperson
were within the scope of her employQent by J. B. Deliran and
House, or were outside the scope, thereby making ERA liable for
any damages caused by those representations.
19, 1982 pre-trial hearing at pp. 41-45, 66).

-16-

(Tr.

of August

As a result of

this discussion at the

hearing, the trial court at

that time denied ERA's Motion to Dismiss.

The jury could have

found for the Actons against ERA and assessed damages against
EPA for fraudulent misrepresentations.

ERA' s argument that the

Actons' claims were therefore without merit and not brought in
good faith must fail.
Tne other point made by EFA is that, since the trial
court ruled as a matter ot law that ERA was the agent of J.B.
Deliran and House, any questions as to liability on the part of
ERA were resolved and ERA never should have been a party in the
case.

What ERA fails to tell this court is that the trial

court made that ruling during jury instructions arguments by
all counsel at the end of the trial in this case.

ERA's

argument that it was determined to be an agent as a matter of
law and thereforL cannot be liable for any misrepresentations
the jury might have found cannot support its theory that it is
entitled to attorney's fees under

§

78-27-56, Utah Code Ann.

(1953, as amended).
\i i

t h r "g a rrl t o C ad y v . Joh n son , 6 7 1 P • 2 d 14 9 ( Ut.

1983), such case undermines ERA's argument that they are
entitled to attorney's teoE.

Jn that case, this court vacated

a trial court judgment of attorney's fees under
Utah Code Ann.

§

78-27-56,

(1953, as amended) on the grounds that, while
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plaintiffs' case was without merit, it was not brought in bad
faitn.

In the instant case, this court need not even address

the issue of bad faith, because, clearly, the Actons' case had
merit.

In the Cady v. Johnson case, both of plaintiffs' causes

of action were dismissed before or at trial.

In the instant

case, none of the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed oefore or
at trial.

The claims had merit.

Cady v. Johnson cannot

support ERA's argument for attorney's fecG.
CONCLUSION
It is the position of the Actons in this brief, as it
has been in their original brief in this appeal, ana their
responding brief to defendants-respondents J. B. Deliran and
House's appeal brief, that the evidence at the trial of this
matter did not support the jury verdict, which

affirmed the

l3nd sale contract between the Actons and J. B. Del1ran and
House.

For the reasons set forth in those preceeding briefs,

the Actons

that the trial court erred in not granting

the Actons' Motion for a Directed Verdict or Judgment
Notwithstanding tne Verdict.
The Actons further submit that ERA has not in any way
proven that it is entitled to attorney's fees in this matter.
They were not a party to the Earnest Money Receipt 2nd Ofter to
Purchase Agreement executed by the Actons and J. B. Deliran and
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Huuse, so they cannot seek attorney's fees pursuant to that
contractual provision.

The lawsuit brought by the Actons

culminated in a three-day jury trial.

At no time before or

during the trial were any of the Actons' causes of actions
disr.iissed.

Therefore, ERA cannot seek attorney's fees for this

ma:ter under the statutory provision of § 78-27-56, Utah Code
Ann.

(1953, as amended).
Respectfully subr.iitted this 22nd day of March, 1384.
PRINCE,

By

GELD ZAHLER

ot"

Jeffrey;
tt
A.tturnEjy¢ tJ,r Pl intiffs-Appellants
and CrdisRussell, Andrew and Carol E. A.cton
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MAILING
On this __fj_day of March, 1984, I hereby certify that
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct
copies of the foregoing RESPONDING BRIEF OF
PLAITNIFFS-APPELLAN:;>S AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS RUSSELL ?\CTOtJ,
ANDREW ACTON AND CAROLE. ACTON,

to the following parties of

record:
Patrick Fenton, Esq.
154 North Main
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Hans Q. Chamberlain, Esq.
110 North Main,
G
Cedar City, Utah 84720

2861G
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